University of Miami International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 2 Volume 22 Issue 2 (Spring 2015)

Article 3

5-1-2015

The Use of Coercion in the Child Maltreatment Investigation Field:
A Comparison of American and Scottish Perspectives
Daniel Pollack
Kirsteen MacKay
Katie Shipp

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel Pollack, Kirsteen MacKay, and Katie Shipp, The Use of Coercion in the Child Maltreatment
Investigation Field: A Comparison of American and Scottish Perspectives, 22 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 129 (2015)
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umiclr/vol22/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami International and Comparative
Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE USE OF COERCION IN THE CHILD MALTREATMENT
INVESTIGATION FIELD:
A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND SCOTTISH PERSPECTIVES

Daniel Pollack, Kirsteen MacKay & Katie Shipp*
INTRODUCTION
....................................
........... 130
PART 1: AMERICAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
.....................
..... 134
A. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
INVESTIGATIONS.
.......................................
136
B. VOLUNTARY PARENTAL COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATIONS
AND DUE PROCESS
.........................................
141
PART 2: SCOTTISH LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
.....................
...... 146
A. THE "CONSTITUTION" OF THE UNITED KINGDOM................146
B.

THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR CHILD PROTECTION IN

SCOTLAND

...........................................

C. THE CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM IN SCOTLAND .................
1) CHILDREN'S HEARINGS SYSTEM (CHS) ..................
2) EMERGENCY INTERVENTIONS
...................
3) CHILD PROTECTION ORDERS (CPO) ..
..........
4) CHILD ASSESSMENT ORDERS (CAO) ............
D.

152

157
157
159
163

165

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF COERCION BY AGENTS OF
THE STATE IN CHILD PROTECTION IN SCOTLAND.................167

CONCLUSION

.................................................

170

The intent of this article is to investigate legal precedents and
principles, which yield plausible uses of coercion in the child
maltreatment investigative context. In doing so, the goal is to
contribute to the underlying legal philosophy and its practical
application in the child maltreatment field. In particular, this article
addresses the use of coercion in the child protective investigative
setting from both an American and Scottish perspective.
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INTRODUCTION

The often-quoted introduction of John Stuart Mills' classic
work, On Liberty, provides a philosophical perspective that may be
said to underpin child protective services:
"The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple
principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings
of society with the individual in the way of
compulsion and control, whether the means used be
physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the
moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is,
that the sole end for which mankind is warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better
for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be
wise, or even right. These are good reasons for
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or
persuading him, or entreating him, but not for
compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from
which it is desired to deter him, must be calculated to
produce evil to some one else. The only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part,
which merely concerns himself, his independence is,
of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign."1
*DANIEL POLLACK, MSSA (MSW), JD, is a Professor at Yeshiva University's
School of Social Work in New York City. He frequently serves as an expert witness
in child welfare cases. Contact information: 212-960-0836; dpollack a)yu.edu

2014 COERCION IN CHILD MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATION

131

Governmental coercion is actual and not merely metaphorical,
although there are limits to its use. Our discussion is on the
application of coercion as a justifiable daily occurrence in the applied
child protection services (CPS) context. From this perspective, CPS
coercive authority is a means of merely reinforcing parental
behaviors that promote the welfare of the child. Simultaneously, we
acknowledge that the unnecessary and excessive use of coercive force
by CPS ultimately undermines its own inherent authority and the
functionality of the state's citizens.
The key role of the CPS investigator is to determine if a child
is at risk of harm. When a child is in immediate danger, CPS and/or
law enforcement work to ensure the child's safety. A safety plan is
often developed, which will keep a child safe at home. When that is
not possible, the child may be taken into protective supervision. CPS
professionals agree that a child may be removed on an emergency
basis if the assessment unequivocally indicates a high risk of danger.
When that determination is uncertain and the evidence is not
incontrovertible, the investigator may nonetheless believe it would be
prudent for the child to go elsewhere temporarily, or to make certain
changes in the household. Towards that end, the investigator may try
to influence, encourage, or persuade the caregiver to take certain
actions for the child's betterment. If that influence, encouragement,
and persuasion crosses the line into coercion, has the investigator
behaved unethically or illegally? Are all or just some forms of
coercion unethical or illegal? 2

KIRSTEEN MACKAY, PhD, MSc, LLB (Hons) is a Research Fellow at the Child
Protection Research Centre, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Contact information: 0131 651 4032; kirsteen.mackay4ed.ac.uk
KATIE SHIPP, Esq., is a practicing attorney with the Marsh Law Firm in New York
City. Contact information: 212-372-3030 Ext: 4; katieshipp@marshlaw.us

&

1 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Will Johnson, CreateSpace Independent
Publishing Platform 4th ed., 2014).
2Daniel Pollack, Coercion and ChildProtective Services Investigations, Policy
Practice 71(6), 30-31 (Dec. 2013), availableat
http://www.youthlaw.org/uploads/pics/APHSACoercion and child protective ser
vices investigations.pdf.
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Michael Bayles writes, "a person is not injured by actions
contrary to his interest if he voluntarily participates in the activity of
which they are a part." 3 The question then becomes: At what point

does "voluntary" become "coercion"?
Perceived coercion by a
caregiver results in the caregiver involuntarily accepting the terms of
a CPS investigator, or the caregiver correctly feeling that what is
being requested allows for no alternative response. Such coercion
may be indicated when there is evidence of a relatively short period
of time between the CPS investigator's alleged coercive requests and
the caregiver's acquiescence to those requests.
Generally, our default stance is to have the unencumbered
choice of the individual be condoned by society. Society only
interferes when absolutely necessary - hence the justification for legal
coercion. Broadly speaking, coercion seeks to restrict another
person's options. Commonly though, we ascribe the term with a
prima facie negative connotation. Coercion implies that one person
attempts to gain the compliance or cooperation of another. Failing to
gain that compliance or cooperation results in a unilateral action by
the coercer.
In the CPS context, coercion may at times be viewed as
having a neutral aspect. Coercive behavior by an investigator seeks to
influence the caregiver's decision-making by linking possible
sanctions to the caregiver's actions or inactions. Imagine a CPS
investigator saying, "Unless there is enough food for your children,
we are going to have to temporarily place them elsewhere." While
admittedly coercive in either the negative or neutral sense, is this
statement unethical or illegal? Ostensibly the intent of the coercion is
legitimate and laudatory - to prevent harm to a child. Coercion that
does not stem from redeeming intentions and has improper aims is
illegitimate, is possibly illegal, and is therefore to be avoided. In any
event, because of the unique nature of each CPS investigation any
alleged coercion must be evaluated in context and with regard to all
of the circumstances of the particular case.
Legislation proscribing or prohibiting action by the state must
be precise.4 Child maltreatment statutes and definitions can be
3 MICHAEL D. BAYLES,

PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION: THE USES OF POLITICAL

AUTHORITY 105 (1st ed. 1978).
4 This fundamental principle was enunciated by Justice Sutherland in Connally v.
GeneralConstruction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): "[T]he terms of a penal statute
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notoriously vague. What exactly is "neglect?" 5 To what extent does a
claim of neglect reflect disapproval of parental choices as opposed to
noncompliance with an understandable definition of legally
acceptable parenting? We defer to dubious parental choices but not
to illegal ones. Practically, competing nuanced interpretations of
"neglect," "abuse," "risk," and similar terms are what CPS
investigators face on a daily basis.
It is quickly evident that coercion is a highly subjective and
contextualized term, and we are without the luxury of a consensually
established precise definition in the CPS context.
Some CPS
investigators may conclude that not only is coercion sometimes
permissible, it is their right and duty to use coercion in order to
impose compliance with the child protection laws they have pledged
to uphold. In other words, they are using their best professional
judgment and concluding that the child's well-being is at stake and
some degree of coercion is necessary. While the foregoing thinking
may at times seem intuitively defensible, it may occasionally lead to
an unbridled, unauthorized, unethical, and illegal use of coercion.
CPS workers must always hold themselves accountable to larger
legal duties, including due process. These duties take precedence
over every aspect of the child protective endeavor.
Fifteen years ago, in his commentary on the topic, "How We
Can Better Protect Children From Abuse and Neglect," Leroy H.
Pelton wrote, "[t]he fundamental structure of the public child welfare
system is that of a coercive apparatus wrapped in a helping
orientation." 6 Agree or not, what are the nature and parameters of
[...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct
on their part will render them liable to its penalties... and a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."
The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, in its practice
guideline series, CHALLENGES IN THE EVALUATION OF CHILD NEGLECT (2008), page
4, notes that "Many express concerns that cultural, socioeconomic, ethnic and racial
biases influence the decision regarding the presence and severity of neglect in a
family. ... As the Child Protective Services and law enforcement responses are
triggered by critical events, the very nature of neglect poses inherent difficulties in
recognition and appropriate response."
6 Leroy H. Pelton, Commentary, Four Commentaries: How We Can Better Protect
Childrenfrom Abuse and Neglect, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, 126 (1998) available
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that coercion? The following working definition is offered: In the CPS
context, coercion (condoned or not), requires that the CPS
investigator (1) explicitly or implicitly indicate that a suggestion or
demand be carried out by the caregiver, and (2) that if the suggestion
or demand is not complied with (3) either the suggestion or demand
or some more onerous action may be carried out.
Parts I and II of this note delve into the American and
Scottish legal perspectives of the use of coercion in the CPS context.
Part III offers a brief conclusion. One caveat: We do not purport to
address the large question regarding the proper use and limits of law
in the broad theoretical sense; nor do we attempt to apply forensic
linguistic principles and theory. CPS, like every other professional
discipline, uses its own language to ease communication within the
profession. Nonetheless, that language must be understandable by
the general population. In the end, we doubtlessly raise as many
questions as we answer.
PART I. AMERICAN LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

-

It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the parent-child relationship from
undue government interference. As the Supreme Court stated in
Troxel v. Granville, "[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case - the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children
is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by this Court." 7 Nevertheless, a parent's right to the care and custody

at

http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/08 01 Commentaries.
pdf.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The Court further explained:
More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399, 401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the
"liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right
of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to
control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed.
1070 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and
guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." We explained in
Pierce that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those
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of their child is limited when the family becomes involved in a child
abuse and neglect investigation. As stated by McGrath, "[w]here a
child's safety is at risk or has already been compromised, the state
has a strong and legitimate interest in protecting the child, which
justifies piercing the cloak of privacy that typically surrounds the life
of a family." 8 Just how far this limitation goes is unclear.
The Supreme Court has not weighed in definitively on the
constitutionality of warrantless searches and seizures of children in
connection with abuse and neglect investigations and the Circuit
Courts have produced conflicting opinions. 9 Additionally, the
"voluntary track" that is available in most states for some child abuse
and neglect investigations is often criticized as not being entirely
voluntary but rather a coercive way to circumvent a parent's rights.10
This part is subdivided into two parts. The first part
addresses the constitutionality of searches and seizures of children in
connection with abuse and neglect investigations. It discusses the
"special needs" doctrine and whether CPS can speak with, search, or
remove a child without first obtaining a warrant or effective consent
by the parent. The second part discusses whether parent cooperation
with CPS can ever truly be voluntary.

who nurture him and direct his destiny have the ight, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." Id., at 535, 45 S.Ct. 571. We returned to the subject
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.
645 (1944), and again confirmed that there is a constitutional
dimension to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary *66 function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder." Id., at 166, 64 S.Ct. 438.
Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child Protection Services:
Perpetuatingthe Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REv. 629, 636-37 (2012).
Teri D. Baxter, Constitutional Limits on the Right of Government Investigators to
Interview and Examine Alleged Victims of ChildAbuse or Neglect, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 125, 127 (2012).
10 McGrath, supra note 8, at 633.
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of

Child

Abuse
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and

Neglect

The Fourth Amendment "special needs" doctrine is described
as distinguishing "between searches and seizures that serve the
'normal need of law enforcement' and those that serve some other
special need, excusing non-law-enforcement searches and seizures
from the warrant and probable cause requirements."" It is still
unclear whether child welfare officials investigating allegations of
child abuse and neglect are bound by the probable cause and warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment or qualify for the "special
needs" exception. 12 However, the issue has been addressed in several
Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions.
The special needs doctrine was established in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 13 He
explained, "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court
entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers." 14 The T.L.O. case involved a warrantless search of a
student's purse by school officials.15 The Court applied a two-prong
reasonableness analysis. 16 The Court first asked if the "state's action
was 'justified at its inception,"' or, stated otherwise, whether the
"state had 'reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence' prior to conducting the search."' 17 Secondly, the
Court asked whether the means used to conduct the search was
"'reasonably related to the objectives of the search' such that the
search [was] not 'excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of

1 Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement: Camreta v. Greene, Child
Protection Investigations and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment Special
Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REv. 353, 353 (2012).
12 Adam Pie, Note, The Monster Under the Bed: The Imaginary CircuitSplit and the
Nightmares Createdin the Special Needs Doctrine'sApplication to Child Abuse, 65
VAND. L. REV. 563, 565 (2012).
13 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
14
Id. at 351.
15

16
17

Id. at 328-29.
Id. at 341.

Pi, supra note 12, at 572.
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the student and the nature of the infraction."' 18 However, Justice
Blackmun believed that the Court omitted an important first step and
stated that an exceptional need must first be found.19
In O'Connor v. Ortega, the Supreme Court embraced Justice
Blackmun's opinion that the special needs doctrine only applies
when the government's interest is "substantially different from 'the
normal need for law enforcement."' 2 0 The Court stated,
"[a]dditionally, while law enforcement officials are expected to
'schoo[l] themselves in the niceties of probable cause,' no such
expectation is generally applicable to public employers, at least when
the search is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense. It is
simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies
to learn the subtleties of the probable cause standard." 21
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court stated that
the special needs doctrine does not apply to a policy developed by a
state hospital and police, which required the hospital to turn over
positive drug tests of pregnant women to the police. 22 The Court
explained that in other earlier cases where the special needs doctrine
did apply, the "'special need' that was advanced as a justification for
the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one
divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement." 23
However, in Ferguson, "the central and indispensable feature of the
policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the
patients into substance abuse treatment." 24 Further, the Court stated,
"[w]hile the ultimate goal of the program may well have been to get
18 Id.

19 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Justice Blackmun stated
"I write

separately, however, because I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis
of whether a school search must be based upon probable-cause. The Court correctly
states that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the
public interest is best served" by a lesser standard. Ante, at 743. I believe that we
have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted
with 'a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."')
20 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
724 (1987).
21 Id. at 724-25 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341-42 (1994)).
22 Fergusonv. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69 (2001).
23 Id. at
79.
24 Id. at
80.

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.

138

V. 22

the women in question into substance abuse treatment and off of
drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal."

25

The Court

recognized that the "threat of law enforcement may ultimately have
been intended as a means to an end, but the direct and primary
purpose was of [the] policy was to ensure the use of those means." 26
As such, the Court held that the special needs doctrine did not apply
and rather the Fourth Amendment's "general prohibition against
nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches necessarily
applies to such a policy." 27 Therefore, the decision in Ferguson
"creates a legal incentive to develop policies that avoid excessive
entanglement between a legitimate special need and law
enforcement."

28

In Safford United School District v. Redding, the school principal
ordered a thirteen year old girl to strip down to her underwear and
"pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the
elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area
to some degree." 29 This search occurred because of a report that the
young girl was distributing medicine to other students.30 The Court
applied the rule of reasonableness, as stated in T.L.O., and found that
the search violated the Fourth Amendment because "the content of
the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion." 31 This case
makes clear that "in order to perform a highly intrusive search, the
state must have a very strong interest in performing the search, and
the information supporting the search must specifically be linked to
the intrusive search."3 2
In 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Camretta v.
Greene, a case involving an in-school warrantless interview of a
suspected child abuse victim. 33 However, the Court was unable to
25
26
27

28
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 86.

Gupta-Kagan, supra note 11, at 390.
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 369 (2009).
Id. at 368.
Id. at 375.
Pid, supra note 12 at 576.
Id. at 566.
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address the issue because the Court dismissed the case, finding the
case-in-controversy moot.34 Therefore, it is still necessary to look at
the varying decisions by the United States Circuit Courts.
Although most Circuit Courts have addressed the issue to
some degree, they have not developed a consensus. A brief overview
of some Circuit Court decisions is necessary to understand the
varying application, or lack thereof, of the special needs doctrine.
Some courts have adopted the doctrine, others have rejected it, and a
few have chosen not to apply it in the case before them, but left open
the option for future application.
In the 1999 case Tenenbaum v. Williams, the Second Circuit
refused to apply the special needs doctrine while still recognizing
that it may apply in other child abuse cases where the child is subject
to immediate danger.3 5 In Tenenbaum, the Court considered a case
where a young girl was suspected to be a victim of abuse. 36 After an
unsuccessful attempt to interview the child at school, the caseworkers
removed her from the classroom without a warrant or parental
consent and took her to the hospital to test for sexual abuse.37 The
court found that requiring the state to seek judicial approval "makes
a fundamental contribution to the proper resolution of the tension
among the interests of the child, the parents, and the state."3 8 Similar
to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in 2002 did not apply the
special needs doctrine in Roe v. Texas Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services, but did not explicitly endorse a position on the
doctrine itself.39 The case involved a young girl who was acting
inappropriately at day camp and was reported as a possible victim of
sex abuse. 40 The caseworkers visited the home and, after discussing
the report with her mother, removed the child's clothes to look for
marks and to take photos.41 The Court limited its inquiry to strip
searches and found that the caseworker violated the Fourth

34 Id.

35 Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 604 (2d Cir. 1999).

Id. at 588-89.
1Id. at 591.
38 Id. at 604. See also Pid, supra note 12, at 590-9 1.
36

37

39 Roe v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395 (5th Cir.

2002); see also Pid, supra note 12, at 591-93.
40 Roe, 299 F.3d at 398.
41 Id. at 399.
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Amendment by conducting the search without demonstrating
probable cause, obtaining a search warrant, obtaining parental
consent, or acting under exigent circumstances. 42
The Third Circuit did not even mention the special needs
doctrine in Good v. Dauphin County Social Services for Children and
Youth in 1989.43 In Good, the Court considered a case where a young

child was allegedly chased and stripped searched by a policewoman
despite no signs of abuse.4 4 The Court stated, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment caselaw has been developed in a myriad of situations
involving very serious threats to individuals and society, and we find
no suggestion there that the governing principles should vary
depending on the assessment of the gravity of society risk
involved."4 5 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the special needs doctrine
in Calabretta v. Floyd in 1999.46 In Calabretta, the Court considered a
case where a caseworker was initially denied access to the home.47

Subsequently, the caseworker entered the home with a police officer
without the consent of the parent, interviewed the children, and
required the mother to remove the child's clothing for a body
search. 48 The Court stated, "[t]he government's interest in the
welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from
physical abuse, but also protecting children's interest in the privacy
and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of
their parents." 49 Further, the Court found, "[t]he reasonable
expectation of privacy of individuals in their homes includes the
interests of both parents and children in not having government
officials coerce entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
humiliate the parents in front of the children."5 0 The Court held that
under these circumstances consent or a warrant was required for

42

Id at 407-08.

Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087 (3d
Cir.1989); see also Pid, supra note 12, at 587-88.
44 Good, 891 F.2d at 1089-90.
45 Id. at 1094.
46 Calabrettav. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Pid, supra note 12, at
588-90.
47 Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 810-12.
48
1Id. at 811-812.
49 Id. at 820.
43

5o

Id.
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entry into the home.5 1
However, unlike the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits,
the Seventh Circuit applied the special needs doctrine to
investigations of child abuse in Darryl H. v. Coler in 1986.52 Darryl H.
involved two consolidated cases that involved caseworkers coming
to the school to interview children who were suspected victims of
abuse.53 The caseworkers also had each of the children disrobe to
inspect them for signs of abuse.5 4 The Court stated, "we cannot say
that the Constitution requires that a visual inspection of the body of a
child who may have been the victim of child abuse can only be
undertaken when the standards of probable cause or a warrant are
met."55 Further, the Court explained, "while the visual inspection of
the child's body may eventually result in a criminal prosecution
against a child abuser, that contingency is certainly of secondary
importance to the [child abuse investigation] at the time the search is
conducted."5 6 The Fourth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Wildauer v. Frederick County in 1993.57
B.

Voluntary Parental Cooperation
and Due Process

in Investigations

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
parent-child relationship from arbitrary governmental interference.5 8
"The Due Process Clause protects parents' property interest in the
care, control, and custody of their children." 59 "It protects procedural

Id. at 813, 817.
DarrylH. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 902 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Pid, supra note 12,
at 581-84.
53 DarrylH., 801 F.2d at 894.
51
52

54 Id. at 896.

5 Id. at 902.
56 Id. (emphasis removed).
Wildauerv. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment);
see also Nicole Stednitz, Note, Ending Family Trauma Without Compensation:
Drafting 1983 Complaintsfor Victims of Wrongful Child Abuse Investigations, 90

OR. L. REV. 1423, 1431 (2012).
Nicole Stednitz, Note, Ending Family Trauma Without Compensation: Drafting
1983 Complaintsfor Victims of Wrongful ChildAbuse Investigations, 90 OR. L. REV.
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rights, which include notice and the opportunity to be heard, and
substantive rights to make decisions on behalf of their children." 60
This is one of the oldest unenumerated rights recognized by the
Court under the Due Process Clause. 61 Further, the Court has
described the right of parents to make decisions concerning the
upbringing and education of their children as the tradition in the
"history and culture of Western civilization." 6 2
However, it is also recognized that these rights have
limitations when a child's safety is in jeopardy. As described by
Soledad A. McGrath, "[w]here a child's safety is at risk or has already
been compromised, the state has a strong and legitimate interest in
protecting the child, which justifies piercing the cloak of privacy that
typically surrounds the life of the family."

63

The family often has the

option to cooperate and voluntarily consent to services offered by the
Child Protection Agency rather than proceed down the traditional
investigatory pathway. The voluntary track is meant to be a nonadversarial approach to helping families who may just need support
and services. 64
When parents consent to participate in services offered by the
Agency, they effectively waive the Agency's obligation to follow
procedural safeguards. 65 Parents agreeing to participate in voluntary
services forgo their right to court hearings, are not entitled to an
attorney, and there is no judicial or administrative mechanism to
determine whether their participation is truly voluntary. 66 Some
parents have explained their motivation to consent as the fear that
"failure to consent 'will only add the curse of 'uncooperative' to the

1423, 1431 (2012).

Nicole Stednitz, Note, Ending Family Trauma Without Compensation: Drafting
1983 Complaintsfor Victims of Wrongful ChildAbuse Investigations, 90 OR. L. REV.
1423, 1431 (2012). See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66 (2000) (plurality opinion); see
also Stednitz, supra note 58, at 1432.
61 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion); see also Stednitz, supra note 58, at
1432.
62 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 232 (1972); see also Stednitz, supra note 58, at 1432.
63 McGrath, supra note 8, at 636-637.
64 Id. at 642.
65 Id. at 637-38.
66 Id. at 666-67.
60
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list of their sins when the case comes to court. . . ."67 While not
directly addressing this issue, the Supreme Court has stated, "(...) it
has been said that many voluntary placements are in fact coerced by
threat of neglect proceedings and are not in fact 'voluntary' in the
sense of the product of an informed consent." 68 However, the Circuit
Courts have differed on the issue.
In Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, the

Children's Bureau had received a call that Dr. Croft was sexually
abusing his daughter. 69 The caseworker and police officer went to the
home to investigate and Dr. Croft consented to be interviewed. 70
After the interview, the caseworker informed the parents that the
child would be placed in foster care that night unless the father left
the home and did not have contact with the child until the
investigation was complete.71 In considering whether the
caseworker's ultimatum was an abuse of government power, the
Third Circuit explained, "a state has no interest in protecting children
from their parents unless it has some reasonable and articulable
evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been
abused or is in imminent danger of abuse." 7 2 The focus was "whether
the information available to the defendants at the time would have
created an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse justifying the
degree of interference with the Croft's rights as Chynna's parents." 73
The Court stated, "[a]n anonymous tip may justify investigation but
will not provide reasonable grounds for removal of a family member
absent independent, articulable criteria of reliability; and certainly
not when all evidence is to the contrary." 7 4 Further, the Court rejected
the Defendant's allegation that Dr. Croft voluntarily left the home. 75
Instead, the Court found the threat of placing his daughter in foster
care as "blatantly coercive." 76
Id. at 670.
Smith v. Org. ofFamiliesforEqual. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834 (1977).
69 Croft v. Westmoreland Cnty. Children and Youth Servs.,
103 F.3d 1123, 1124 (3d
Cir. 1997).
67
68

70 Id.
71 Id.
72

Id. at 1126.

73 Id.
74 Id.

Mill, supra note 1, at 1127.

76 Id.
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In Dupuy v. Samuels, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether
the Illinois Department of Children and Family Service's use of safety
plans was coercive and violated parents' due process rights.7 7 The
Court explained that the state sometimes offers parents, in lieu of
immediately removing the child from the home, the option of
agreeing to a safety plan, which imposes restrictions short of removal
until the completion of the state's investigation. 78 "The plan might
require that one of the parents leave the house where the child is
living, or that he keep out of the child's presence unless a designated
family member is present as well, or that the child be sent to live with
other family members." 79 The Court found that parents are not
entitled to a hearing before they are offered the option of agreeing to
a safety plan and that such plans are not coercive.80 Specifically, it
stated,
"[t]here is no right to a hearing when no substantive
right has been infringed or is threatened with being
infringed. The state does not force a safety plan on the
parents; it merely offers it. Parents are entitled to a
hearing if their parental rights are impaired, but the
offer of a settlement no more impairs those rights
than a prosecutor's offer to accept a guilty plea
impairs the defendant's right to trial by jury." 81
Further, it found,
[i]t adds nothing to say as the plaintiffs do that they
did not really consent- that the state 'coerces'
agreement to safety plans by threatening to remove
the child from his parents custody unless they agree
to the plan. It is not a forbidden means of 'coercing' a

Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Soledad A. McGrath,
Differential Response in Child Protection Services: Perpetuating the Illusion of
Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629, 678-679 (2012).
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760.
7 Id. at 761.
80 Id. at 761-62.
81 Id. at 761.
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settlement to threaten merely to enforce one's legal
rights.82

Additionally, it stated,
There is no suggestion that the agency offers a safety
plan when it has no suspicion at all of neglect or
abuse, and even in that case the ordinary prerequisite
to a finding of duress-that the person have no
effective legal remedy against the threat-would be
missing, since if a child is actually taken, the parents
have a very prompt legal remedy.... We can't see how
parents are made worse off by being given the option
of accepting the offer of a safety plan. It is rare to be
disadvantaged by having more rather than fewer
options.83
While the Court recognized that evidence of misrepresentation or use
of improper means by the state might have led to a different
outcome, it held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief. 84
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Smith v. Williams-Ash, held that
the temporary removal of the children from the home after the
parents consented to a safety plan did not violate due process.85 Due
to unsanitary and dangerous living conditions, the caseworker
persuaded the parents to consent to a safety plan that removed the
children from the home and placed them at a friend's home in the
neighborhood. 86 Under this safety plan, the parents were able to
maintain close contact and visit regularly. 87 The Court adopted the
reasoning set forth in Dupuy and found that the parents remained in
the safety plan voluntarily at all times.88
Further, the Court
explained, "[w]e do not doubt that the Smiths, as any parents likely

82

83
84

Id. at 762.
Id.
Id.

Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2008); see also McGrath, supra note
77, at 678-79.
86 Smith, 520 F.3d 598.
87 Id.

8Id.

at 600.
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would, resented the safety plan from the beginning. But mere
displeasure and frustration fails to negate their consent. 89
Therefore, what exactly constitutes consent varies among the
courts. Some Courts have found that a parent may be said to execute
effective consent while others have found such circumstances to be
inherently coercive. While the voluntary track may have advantages,
there are also several procedural safeguards parents relinquish when
they comply.
PART II.

SCOTTISH LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

While the United States has a written Constitution, the
nations that make up the United Kingdom do not. This section on the
child protection system in Scotland therefore begins by describing
what may instead be said to comprise the 'constitution of the United
Kingdom' and its relevance to state interference in family life. It then
proceeds to identify those responsible for child protection
investigations in Scotland, the processes they use, and the legislation
that investigators rely on to effect this protection. Embedded within
this is a discussion of the extent to which coercion plays a part in the
child protection endeavor and the features of the investigative
process, which act as checks to this coercion to prevent its
inappropriate or excessive exercise.
A.

The "Constitution" of the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is comprised of England, Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland. The constitution is "made up of the
body of rules and arrangements concerning the government of the
country." 90 There are documents, however, which form a part of this
'body of rules' such as the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights
in 1689 (England) and the Claim of Right 1689 (Scotland). The Magna
Carta included a declaration of the liberties to be enjoyed by 'freemen
of the realm' and the Bill of Rights made it illegal for a monarch to
pass laws without Parliament's consent. It also sets out other
fundamental protections such as forbidding the state from imposing
excessive fines and from cruel and unusual punishments. Key
'9 Id. at 601.
90 COLIN R. MuNRo, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (2d ed. 2002).
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principles arising from the collective body of rules making up the
'constitution of the UK' are that of the 'rule of law,' 'parliamentary
sovereignty' (which limits the prerogative of the monarch) and the
'separation of powers' (the separation of the Legislature from the
Judiciary).
In the early 18th century two further documents became part
of what may collectively be called the 'constitution of the UK': the
Act of Union with Scotland 1706, which was passed by the English
Parliament, and the Act of Union with England 1707, which was
passed by the Scottish Parliament. Under these Acts the Scottish and
English Parliaments united to form the one Parliament of Great
Britain and became based in the Palace of Westminster in London.
Prior to this union the two nations had been separate states, with
separate legislation, although they came to share the same monarch
at the time of the Union of the Crowns in 1603.91
For nearly 300 years - up until 1999 - the Parliament of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain passed all law applicable to
Scotland as well as those applicable to England. However it is
important to note that Scots law (based on a mix of legal systems
including feudal, Civil and Canon law) continued to apply in
Scotland (as did a separate court structure). As a result, in many
significant areas of law the UK Parliament in London had to pass
separate legislation for Scotland. This often took the form of separate
Acts of Parliament (such as the Children (Scotland) Act, 1995) or
separate statutory provisions applicable to Scotland that were
included within the one Act of the UK Parliament. 92
In 1998, following a referendum within Scotland the previous
year, 93 an Act of the UK Parliament, the Scotland Act 1998,
established a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh and devolved to it the

When King James VI of Scotland inherited the English throne after the death of
his distant relative, Queen Elizabeth I of England. BRADLEY, A., EWING, K.,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 (Longman, 14th ed.
2006).
92 Id. At
38.
93 In which 74% of voters supported a Scottish Parliament. HILAIRE BARNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 374 (Cavendish Publishing 4th ed.
2002).
91
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power to legislate for Scotland on most matters except taxation,
welfare spending and defense.94
At a further referendum in September 2014, the people of
Scotland narrowly voted to remain part of the United Kingdom,
following promises from the UK Parliament that additional powers
will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. This means that, as the
United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union, Scotland
remains a part of the European Union. As such, all legislation passed
by either the UK Parliament or the Scottish Parliament has to be
compliant with European Union Law. The European Union is a rich
source of law in respect of the rights of individuals and family
members within the member states, reflecting the origins of the EU as
a reaction against the atrocities of World War II and motivated by the
will to unite the countries of Europe so as to avoid a recurrence. 95
All States that are members of the European Union are
signatories to the Convention for the Protection of Fundamental
Freedoms and Human Rights ("ECHR") (1950). Key among the
eighteen rights and freedoms within the Convention are the right to
life, the prohibition of torture, the prohibition of slavery and forced
labor, the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial and no
punishment without law, the freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, the freedom of expression, and the freedom of assembly and
association. Of particular importance to the focus of this article,
under Article 8 the ECHR states:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence 96
There shall be no
with the exercise
accordance with
democratic society
94

interference by a public authority
of this right except such as in
the law and is necessary in a
in the interests of national security,

Scotland Act 1998, §29(2)(b) and Schedule 5.
In 1949 the Council of Europe was established as the first pan-European

organization and continues to exist. All States that are members of the European
Union are also a member of this Council of Europe as are a number of States that are
not a part of the European Union. For more information see the website of the
European Union at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/indexen.htm
96 European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, para. 1.

2014 COERCION IN CHILD MALTREATMENT INVESTIGATION

149

public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others 97
Citizens of States who are signatories to the ECHR can appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") in Strasbourg if
they believe agents of the State in which they reside have breached
their human rights. In the case of A v. the United Kingdom, 98 a nineyear-old boy who had been repeatedly beaten by his stepfather with
a garden cane claimed that the subsequent acquittal of his stepfather,
based on grounds that the beating was 'reasonable chastisement,'
represented a breach of his ECHR Article 3 right to freedom from
'torture, inhumane and degrading treatment. . . .' The ECtHR agreed
that the UK Government had not provided the boy with adequate
protection against ill treatment contrary to Article 3 and the United
Kingdom Government accepted that the law required amendment
and paid compensation to the now-adult victim. 99
The ECHR has also successfully been founded upon to plead
that the state's failure to intervene in a family, when the state knew
or ought to have known that the children were being maltreated, was
similarly a breach of the children's Article 3 right to 'freedom from
torture or inhumane or degrading treatment.' 0 0
As well as being a member of the EU, the United Kingdom is
also a member of the United Nations (UN) and has ratified the

Id. at para. 2.
98 A. v. the United Kingdom, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2692 (1998).
9 Since this case, the ECHR has become part of the domestic law of the United
Kingdom via an Act of the UK, and citizens can therefore plead within the domestic
courts of the UK that their human rights have breached - rather than having to take
the case all the way to the ECtHR in Strasbourg. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42
(U.K.). Since 2003 in Scotland, under criminal law, it is now the case that if a person
claims that something done to a child was physical punishment carried out in the
exercise of a parental right the court must decide that what was done was not a
justifiable assault if it included a blow to the head, or shaking or the use of an
implement - although the court still maintains the power to determine on 'whatever
other grounds it thinks fit.' Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 2003, (A.S.P. 7), §51.
100 Z and others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29392/95, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97
(2002).
9
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child ("UNCRC").101
The UNCRC requires that "States Parties shall respect and ensure the
rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind."102 Children are
defined as individuals up to the age of eighteen years unless the age
of majority is attained earlier within their nation state.
Under the UNCRC, children are not to be separated from
their families unless necessary for their welfare:
States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be
separated from his or her parents against their will,
except when competent authorities subject to judicial
review determine, in accordance with applicable law
and procedures, that such separation is necessary for
the best interests of the child. Such determination
may be necessary in a particular case such as one
involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents,
or one where the parents are living separately and a
decision must be made as to the child's place of
residence.1 03
The UNCRC also gives children who are capable of forming
their own views the right to express those views freely in all matters
affecting the child. 104 This right expressly extends to "judicial and
administrative proceedings affecting the child," wherein they are
afforded a right to either put their views either "directly, or through a
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with
the procedural rules of national law."105
Both the ECHR and the UNCRC have had significant impact
on the process of child maltreatment investigations in Scotland.
Adults and children have a right to a family life and also have a right
to protection from abusive treatment. Thus state intervention has to
The only members of the UN not to have ratified the UNCRC are the United
States of America and Somalia.
102 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. GAOR,
101

44th Sess. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/44/25, at 167 (Nov. 20, 1989).
103 Id. at
168.
104 Id
105

Id.
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balance these possibly conflicting rights at the level of the individual
as well as at the level of family members in relation to each other.
Intervention in family life by the state will be lawful as long as it is
proportionate to the harm it is seeking to prevent. For example, a
parent may claim it is an infringement of his or her "right to a family
life," if his or her child is removed into care, whereas the state party
seeking to protect the child (or even the child seeking to protect him
or herself) could be found on the child's right to be protected from
"inhumane and degrading treatment."10 6
When such conflict exists between the rights of parents and
the rights of a child, in principle it is the welfare of the child that is
paramount. 107 Thus, for example, in the recent case of A v. H, 108 the
court concluded that reduction of a mother's contact with her child
who was currently in care was:
no breach of [mother's] art.8 rights where it was clear
that all actions had been prompted by the application
of the principle that [the child's] welfare was the
paramount consideration, therefore, interference with
[the mother's] private and family life was
proportionate and justified in the circumstances, and
the sheriff had been entitled to so conclude.
Consistent with Article 12 UNCRC, in Scotland, children's
views are regularly sought in cases concerning them. 109 However, it
remains extremely rare for children to raise an action founding on
their own right to protection from abuse at the hands of their parents.
Children in Scotland may instruct a solicitor in any civil matter if they have "a
general understanding of what it means to do so" and are presumed to have such an
understanding from the age of twelve. Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act, 1991,
c. 50, § 2.
107 Children (Scotland) Act, 1995, c. 36, § 11(7). But see Oyeneyin v. Oyeneyin
(1999) G.W.D. 38-1836 (Scot.) (determining that the parent's ECHR Article 6 right
to a fair trial may trump a child's welfare in the context of that children wish their
views on contact with a non-resident parent to be kept confidential in a child contact
dispute).
10 A v. H (2013) G.W.D. 32-634 (Scot.).
109 The Children's Hearings System has a form called
"All About Me" which is
included in the papers put before the hearing whenever it is practicable to do so. This
form can be accessed from: http://www.scra.gov.uk/home/allaboutmeform.cfm
106
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More often, they may enter as a party minuter in an action between
the parent and a state party (such as a local area authority). 110
B.

Those responsible for child protection in Scotland

In 1884, the first UK Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children was established in London, followed shortly afterwards by
branches in Scotland, leading to the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children Act in 1889. By 1921, the Scottish organization became the
Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
("RSSPCC") and investigated child abuse and neglect.
This
continued until 1968 when the Social Work (Scotland) Act vested
responsibility for child protection in local authority social workers.
Since then, a far greater emphasis has come to be placed on
coordinated multi-agency work, particularly the sharing of
information between state agencies so that children at risk of harm do
not fall through the safety net.11 1 The Police, the National Health
Service (NHS), 1 12 and the thirty-two local authorities that run state
schools and employ social workers are all "key agencies and have the

In one case the parents of children aged 14 and 11 told their son he was disabled
and had to go to a specialist high school. He had actually been assessed as not
having any additional support needs. The parents refused to accept local authority
concerns about their child's welfare and appealed to the court. Consistent with their
Article 12 UNCRC right, the children entered as parties to the action and were
represented in court by their own solicitor (representing their wishes) as well as by a
'safeguarder' (representing their best interests). The court determined that the
children were at risk of harm and the case was remitted to the Children's Hearings
System (CHS). This happened in the Scottish case of BR v Grant 2000 Fam. L.R. 2
I This practice builds on the findings of a number of Serious Case Reviews (SCR)
undertaken after the death of children due to maltreatment which concluded that had
all the separate pieces of information held by different agencies been shared, action
would have been more likely and the child might have been saved. See MARIAN
110

BRANDON ET AL., ANALYSING CHILD DEATHS AND SERIOUS INJURY THROUGH ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: WHAT CAN WE LEARN?

A

BIENNIAL ANALYSIS OF SERIOUS CASE

2003-2005 (DCSF Publications 2008).
112 This agency provides free medical and surgical care to all residents of the UK at
point of need.
REvIEwS
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responsibility for working together to identify and commission child
protection activity."113
How these agents of the State go about this task is informed
by the Scottish Government's child welfare policy known as Getting
it Right for Every Child ("GIRFEC"), first published in 2008. This
policy document is further augmented by the Scottish Government
National Guidance for Child Protection in Scotland, published in
2010 and 'refreshed' in 2014.114 This guide sets out how the multiagency approach should be put in to effect. It is required to have a
named professional (usually a social worker) to take a lead role in the
joint working so that diffusion of responsibility does not
inadvertently place the child at greater risk. Further, "where evidence
suggests that a coordinated plan involving two or more agencies will
be necessary, a "Child's Plan" should also be drawn up." 115 This plan
should "comprise a single plan of action" which is reviewed at a
meeting involving all relevant agencies. Within the specific context of
child protection concerns, the Child's Plan becomes known as the
"Child Protection Plan." The single meeting is referred to as a "Child
Protection Case Conference" where:
[i]t will be for the chair of the meeting to ensure that
the discussion stays focused on specific concerns
about the safety of the child, the actions required to
reduce risk and whether the case should be referred
to the Children's Reporter. 116
All children who are the subject of an inter-agency Child
Protection Plan have their names placed on a "Child Protection
Register" for as long as they are deemed to be at significant risk. The
113 Protectingchildren and young people: child protection committees, SCOTTISH
EXECUTIVE, 1 (2005),

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/36496/0023577.pdf.
114 The Scottish Government, National Guidancefor Child Protection in Scotland
2014 WWW.SCOTLAND.GOV.UK (2014),

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0045/00450733.pdf. [Hereafter, National
Guidance, 2014].
115 The Scottish Government, National Guidancefor Child Protection in Scotland
(2010), WWW.SCOTLAND.GOV.UK, 47, (2010),

http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/15026/i/0109279.pdf. [Hereafter, National Guidance, 2010].
116 Id. at para. 49.
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register "has no legal status but provides an administrative system
for alerting practitioners that there is sufficient professional concern
about a child to warrant an inter-agency Child Protection Plan." 117
As well as a multi-agency approach, GIRFEC emphasizes the
need for "early, proactive intervention in order to create a supportive
environment and identify any additional support they [family
members] may need as early as possible." 118 The aspiration for early
support to families is in the hope that will prevent the need for
emergency interventions at a later stage and may enable family
members to remain together.
This early intervention aspiration is set within the context
that all families in Scotland benefit from free universal provision of
health services, which includes a health visitor1 19 being assigned to
every new mother and her child. The health visitor visits the mother
in her own home and her role is "to provide support during the
antenatal period," to "teach parents how to meet the nutritional
needs of their infants and young children and develop healthy
lifestyles, to enable parents in the most need to develop parenting
skills and confidence and to connect them to further sources of
support," to "monitor and assess the development, health and
wellbeing of all infants and young children to [detect] early any
issues which require further action." 120 More importantly health
visitors also act as the named professional and first point of contact

117

Id. at para 54;

There were 7,386 children in Scotland on the Child Protection Register at the 3 1s
July, 2013. The key recorded reason was 'neglect' for 1,029; 'emotional abuse' for
1,027; 'Parental substance abuse', 993; 'Domestic abuse', 888; 'Parental Mental
illness', 600; 'Physical abuse', 537; 'non-engaging family' 548; 'Sexual abuse', 208.
For the full list of statistics see Child ProtectionRegister Statistics Scotland: 2009-

2013, NSPCC, (2014), http://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/statisticsand-information/child-protection-register-statistics-scotland.pdf.
118 National Guidance, 2010, supra note 115, para.
10.

A health visitor is a specialist-trained nurse.
The Importance for Scotland of Health Visiting in the Early years, RCN
SCOTLAND, (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.rcn.org.uk/_data/assets/pdf file/0010/499843/Joint briefing on health
119

120

visitors.pdf.
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for all health and well-being and child protection issues for children
under five.

121

In addition to such health staff, local authorities, established
by Acts of Parliament, have specific duties to children, particularly to
those who fall within the definition of being "in need." 122 This term is
defined by statute to include children who "are unlikely to achieve or
maintain a reasonable standard of health or development without
local authority assistance"; "children whose health or development is
likely to be significantly impaired without such assistance"; "disabled
children" and children "affected by the disability of another member
of the family." 123 The support given to children "in need" most
usually takes the form of supporting the family to care for them (such
as taking a child to and from nursery care for a mother who is
overwhelmed by caring for newborn twins) but it can include cash
assistance in emergency circumstances. 124 However, when a parent is
unable to care for their child at all, 12 5 the local authority must provide
that child with accommodation. 126 Such a child then becomes "looked
after" by the local authority and the local authority becomes subject
to specific duties to safeguard and promote the child's welfare, to
promote contact between the child and his or her parents and to take
into account the views of the child and of the parents when making
decisions in respect of the child.127 Children who are removed from
their family homes as a result of child protection investigations also
fall within the statutory definition of being "looked after" by the local
authority. 128

Key elements of the GIRFEC approach to supporting families is now enshrined in
the Children and Families (Scotland) Act 2014, which inter a/ia requires every child
in Scotland to have such a 'named person' acting as a first point of contact for all
wellbeing and protection issue throughout their childhood with nursery and school
staff taking over from health visitors for older children.
122 Children (Scotland) Act,
1995, § 22.
123 Id. at § 17.
124 Id. at § 22(3)(b)
125 There is universal provision of free health care in Scotland
(including all meals
while in hospital). Those who cannot afford to cost of travelling to hospital can also
claim this cost of this expense from the state.
126 Id. at § 25.
127 Id. at § 17.
128 Id. at § 17(6).
121
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The local authorities in Scotland that maintain the Child
Protection Register for their area and all local authorities also have a
Child Protection Committee made up of chief officers of the agencies
involved in child protection work. The committees operate as the
"key local bodies for developing and implementing child protection
strategy across and between agencies." 129 Members have to have
sufficient authority within their organization that they are able to
implement the required policy and resource commitments agreed by
the Child Protection Committee. One primary function is to raise
awareness of child protection issues within communities, and to
promote the work of agencies that protect children to the public at
large so that members of the public know what to do if they have
concerns about a child. 130
However, although members of the public, such as neighbors,
may report concerns, they are not under a legal duty to do so in
contrast to social workers and, of course, the police. Under the Police
(Scotland) Act 1967, the police have a duty "to guard, patrol and
watch so as-(i) to prevent the commission of offences, (ii) to
preserve order, and (iii) to protect life and property." 131 While, under
the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, a local authority that
considers "(a) that the child is in need of protection, guidance,
treatment or control, and (b) that it might be necessary for a
compulsory supervision order to be made in relation to the child,"
"must make all necessary inquiries into the child's circumstances." 1 32
In this way, the child may become the subject of a Child Protection
Case Conference and/or may be referred to the Children's Hearings
System where such a "compulsory supervision order" may be made.
It is to the process for making a "compulsory supervision order" in
respect of children that this paper now turns.

129
130

Protecting Children and Young People at 9, supra note 113.
Id

Police (Scotland) Act,1967, § 17. Police also have the statutory duty to give all
relevant information on a child to the Children's Hearings System if they believe
that a 'compulsory supervision order' may need to be made in relation to a child.
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act, 2011, (A.S.P. 1), § 61.
132 Children's Hearing (Scotland) Act at § 60.
131
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The Child Protection System in Scotland

The child protection system in Scotland is unique and
significantly different from the other nations making up the UK
because it is underpinned by a separate legal tradition, separate court
structure and especially because of the existence of the Children's
Hearings System which may grant a "compulsory supervision
order." The processes described in this paper should not therefore be
assumed to apply anywhere else within the UK.
The child protection system in Scotland is also one that has a
high level of regulation. This regulation may be said to have twin
functions. It exists to protect family members from unnecessary or
disproportionate intrusion into their private and family life; but also,
conformity to the procedural rules and regulations and protects those
whose job it is to investigate child maltreatment from any possible
allegations of malpractice (or neglect of duty) in the event that a child
known to them as being at "risk of harm," is actually harmed.
1.

Children'sHearings System (CHS)

Anyone who has concerns over the welfare of a child can
make a referral to a Reporter of the Children's Hearing System,
which deals with cases where a child is thought to be in need of care
and protection, as well as in cases where a person under the age of 16
has committed an offence or is regularly truant from school. 133 It is
the Reporter's role to determine if there is sufficient evidence to
support a claim that the child needs what is called a "compulsory
supervision order" and, if so satisfied, the parent(s) and/or the child
will appear before a panel of three trained volunteers from the local
community whose role is to decide what form the "compulsory
supervision order" should take. Children, as well as parents, are
given the opportunity to express their views. Attendance at a hearing
is compulsory and warrants can be issued by a court in the event of
non-attendance.

This system which is unique to Scotland was established by the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 following the 'Kilbrandon Repot' (1964), which removed child
welfare cases from the civil courts in Scotland and all but the most serious cases of
juvenile offending (ie: rape or murder) from the criminal courts.
133
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The panel may decide that the child can remain within their
family home but under the supervision of a social worker, who will
visit the child to monitor the circumstances of the child. 134
Alternatively, the panel may decide the child requires to be placed
within the care of extended family members or foster careers, or
indeed that he or she should reside within a residential unit or secure
accommodation (these latter options usually only apply to older
children referred to the CHS as they have committed an offence).
The law pertaining to the Children's Hearings System (CHS)
is now contained within the Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011
and it is here that the grounds for referring children to the Reporter
are listed. The Reporter can only arrange for a Children's Hearing if
at least one of the seventeen grounds listed in the 2011 Act is satisfied
by the available evidence. Key among these grounds of referral are:
"the child is likely to suffer unnecessarily, or the health or
development of the child is likely to be seriously impaired, due to a
lack of parental care" the child has been a victim of a "schedule 1"
(sexual) offence;135 and the child either is, or is likely to, have a close
connection with a person who has committed a "schedule 1 offence"
or has carried out domestic abuse. Children who have committed an
offence or misused alcohol or drugs or who are beyond the control of
a relevant person, as well as those who are at risk of being pressured
into marriage can also be referred to the CHS.

The panel of the CHS can be quite specific in recommending that the local
authority must provide some particular service to support the family and the local
authority faces penalties if it does not then implement the terms of the "compulsory
supervision order.".Id. at §146. This power was introduced as local authorities did
not always implement the terms required by the CHS on the basis of a lack of
available resources.
135 Meaning an offence under Part I of the Criminal Law (consolidation)(Scotland)
Act 1995 including: any offence against children under the Sexual Offences
(Scotland) Act 2009 and offences under the Children and Young Persons (Scotland)
Act 1937 (neglect likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to the child's
health, causing and allowing children to be used for begging, exposure of children
under 7 to risk of burning, children under 16 taking part in performances
endangering life and limb); Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation (Scotland) Act
2005; Protection of Children and Prevention of Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2005
and s52 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (indecent photography of
child under 17 years).
134
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Against the background that Scotland has a population of just
one million children, 136 in 2012-2013, 22,561 children in Scotland were
referred on at least one occasion to the CHS, the vast majority being
referred on care and protection grounds, 20,308, rather than on
grounds that they had committed an offence. 137 And, 79.4% of the
referrals were made by the police. 138 As oft March 2013, there were
12,514 children in Scotland who were the subject of a "compulsory
supervision order" (representing 1.3% of children in Scotland).
Following the intervention of the CHS, a significant number of these
12,514 children remained living with their parent(s) (5,952), with the
next highest number being placed in foster care (3,187) or with a
relative or friend (1,312).139
It is vitally important to note that that the CHS is embedded
within civil process and does not function to determine the "guilt" or
otherwise of any person, nor to pass judgment or sentence. Rather,
the focus is on obtaining the best outcome for the child, although
reports made into the circumstances of a child who has been referred
to the CHS may be requested by a criminal court should a criminal
charge be brought by a procurator fiscal in respect of an offence
against a child.140
2.

Emergency Interventions

When children are believed to be at immediate risk of
significant harm there may not be time to refer the child to the
Reporter in order to secure their protection and emergency measures
are in place; therefore, allowing for the removal of a child from his or
National Records of Scotland, Mid-2011 & Mid-2012 Population Estimates
Scotland,
http://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/statistics/statistics-bytheme/population/population-estimates/mid-year-population-estimates/2012/list-oftables (then scroll down and click the PDF file for Table lb)..
137 SCRA Annual Report, Changing for Children and Young People, SCOTTISH
136

CHILDREN'S

REPORTER

ADMINISTRATION,

19

(2012-2013),

http://www.scra.gov.uk/sites/scra/cmsresources/Annual%/`20Report%/`20201213.htm
1
138 Id. at
20.
139 Id. at
24.
140 See Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act at § 17(1)(b),
61. Under s61 of the 2011
Act - if a constable has written a report for a procurator fiscal in respect of a child
(under s. 17(1)(b) then he has to refer the child to the children's reporter also.
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her home. Detailed legislation exists to regulate the manner in which
this may be undertaken.
Most police in Scotland are unarmed and do not have an
automatic right to force entry into properties either at common law or
under statute. 141 Nor do they have the right to search private
premises without a warrant, "excepting in exceptional and urgent
circumstances, and as subsequently agreed by courts on a case by
case basis." 142 This is within the context that only approximately 1.3%
of citizens are licensed owners of firearms. 143
Once a police officer has entered a property either by the
consent of the occupier or on the basis of a warrant, and that officer
develops a "reasonable grounds to believe" that a child has been, or
is likely to be, neglected or treated in such a way that the child is
likely to suffer significant harm, the officer may take a child to a place
of safety. This provided it is not "reasonable" to first obtain a specific
court order for this action. As would be the case if the courts are
closed for the day or weekend. 144 Under statute, the child can only be
kept in the place of safety for up to 24 hours and "as soon as is
141 Although specialist firearms officers exist who can respond to urgent or
unexpected threats.
142 Justice Committee, Criminal Justice (Scotland)
Bill, (as introduced)(May 6,
2014),.
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4 JusticeCommittee/Inquiries/CJ 16. Police Sco
tland.pdf.
143 A report published in May 2013 stated that there were 25,702 certified firearms
holders and 48,168 shotgun holders in Scotland (Scottish Government (2013)
Firearm
Certificate
Statistics
Scotland
2012.
Available
at:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0042/00423374.pdf).
This is against the
background that as of the 8th August 2013 the population of Scotland was 5,313,600
(National Records of Scotland (2012) Mid-2011 and Mid-2012 Population
Estimates; available at http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/files2/stats/populationestimates/mid20l2/mid-2011-2012-pop-est.pdf). NOTE: The laws on firearms were
tightened following the massacre of sixteen young children in their school in
Dunblane, Scotland and offences in which a firearm was allegedly involved has been
falling year on year in Scotland since 2008 (Scottish Government (2012) Recorded
crimes and offences involving firearms Scotland 2011-2012. Available at:
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0040/00409280.pdf).
144 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act at § 56. Children removed by police officers
have to be referred to the Reporter of the CHS as soon as practicable. There is a
similar provision for any 'person' (which includes local authorities) to apply to a
Justice of the Peace when it not 'practicable' to apply to a court due to court. See
also Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act at § 55.
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practicable" the officer has to inform the Principal Reporter of the
CHS, 145who has the power to give notice to the police constable to
"release the child." 146
It is more usual for police or social workers to obtain a court
order for the purpose of the compulsory removal of children without
parental consent. 147 There are two main types of order: Child
Assessment Orders (CAO) and Child Protection Orders (CPO).148
Both court orders may only be obtained on the basis that there are
reasonable grounds to believe the child is or has been suffering
"significant harm". The legislation does not define the term
"significant harm," but the Scottish National Guidance for Child
Protection gives a definition that emphasizes the impact on the
individual child:
"Harm" means the ill treatment or the impairment of
the health or development of the child, including, for
example, impairment suffered as a result of seeing or
hearing the ill treatment of another. In this context,
"development" can mean physical, intellectual,
emotional, social or behavioural development and
"health" can mean physical or mental health. Whether
the harm suffered, or likely to be suffered, by a child
or young person is "significant" is determined by
comparing the child's health and development with
what might be reasonably expected of a similar
child. 149

S56(2) and

s56(3) Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011.
A similar but probably little known procedure also exists whereby 'any person'
can apply to a justice of the peace for an order requiring a child to be delivered to a
specified person (or preventing the removal of the child from any place where the
child is staying). Again this is for a period of up to 24 hours and can only be
obtained when it is not practicable to apply to the court and the Reporter has to be
informed. S55 Children's Scotland (Act) 2011.
147While Justices of the Peace in Scotland may also authorize the removal of the
child. s. 55, Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011.
148 S 35 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 - Child Assessment order and s. 37
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 - child protection order.
149 National Guidance, 2014, supra note 114,
para. 42, at 13.
15
146
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Although CPOs are emergency orders, parents have
successfully appealed against court decisions not to let them be heard
prior to the granting of CPOs. This may happen when it may be
argued that the children were not at risk of harm at the time the order
was made. This happened in the case of NJ v. Lord Advocate,150 where

the newborn infants of two mothers were still within the hospital at
the time the orders were sought. The court determined that:
The considerations which had to apply before the
extreme step of depriving the parent of the right to be
heard were where a compelling case existed for
applying without first giving the parent's notice and
where there was an emergency or other great
urgency, and in the present petitions, the degree of
urgency could not be said to have amounted to an
emergency: the children were secure in hospital. 151
While the court will consider each application for a CPO on
its merits, there is little doubt that the possibility that a local authority
social work department may obtain such an order could have a
coercive impact upon parent. Therefore a parent may agree to their
child being assessed "voluntarily" or accommodated by the local
authority. 152 Should a parent then later ask for their child to be
returned to them, the local authority may at that point obtain a court
order to ensure the child remains within the care system.1 53
Nonetheless, safeguards against the inappropriateuse of these court

orders exist and require closer consideration.

50

NJ v. Lord Advocate [2013] CSOH 27.

151
152

Id. at 32, 33.

For example, in the case of Aberdeen City Council v M, 2010 G.W.D. 34-700, a
child was said to have been 'voluntarily' placed into the care of the local authority,
but this was within the context that the child's older three siblings had already been
removed into care. The parents in this case were (unsuccessfully) seeking to prevent
the subsequent adoption of this youngest child by his foster caregivers.
153 This happened in the case of Aberdeen City Council
vM 2010 G.W.D. 34-700.
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Child ProtectionOrders (CPO)

-

Following a national child protection scandal in 1991,
significant reform was made to the emergency child protection
procedures in Scotland. The scandal occurred in one of the many
islands of Orkney, off the northern coast of mainland Scotland, when
nine children aged 8-15 years were removed on court order from
their families in a synchronized dawn raid due to suspicions of ritual
satanic child abuse. Whether or not the children were, in fact, victims
of such abuse was never tested in court. This is because the sheriff
hearing the parent's appeal against the ground for referral to the
Children's Hearing System said that the case was "fatally flawed"
due to the absence of the children in the court room at that appeal
hearing. While the Reporter successfully appealed this decision, "the
publicity surrounding the case had made a fair trial impossible."15 4 A
judicial enquiry followed, which led to a tightening of the statutory
provisions regulating child protection procedures in Scotland
particularly the introduction of tight procedural timeframes.
Child Protection Orders can be obtained by a local authority
or "any person," and may include a warrant for the child to be taken
to a place of safety or authorize the prevention of removal of the child
from a place where the child is staying. Alternatively, they may
authorize the carrying out of an assessment of the child's health and
development. When the application for a CPO is made by a local
authority, in addition to being satisfied that the child is at risk of
"significant harm," the court has also to be satisfied that the local
authority is "making enquiries to allow it to decide whether to take
action to safeguard the welfare of the child" and that "the enquires
are being frustrated by access to the child being unreasonably
denied" and "access is required as a matter of urgency."15 5
The application to the court has to be accompanied by
supporting evidence and, as soon as is "practicable" after the order
has been made, the applicant must inform the following persons: the
Sloan v. B., [1991] S.L.T. 530. The appeal judge was highly critical of the
Sheriff's decision stating it "amounted to a serious breach of the rules of natural
justice, which excluded him from any further involvement in the proceedings." For,
at the time, it was permissible to dispense with the children's presence in court under
Children (Scotland) Act, 1995, supra note 107, at s. 40(2).
155 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act, 2011, supra note 122, para.
38.
154
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person who is required to produce the child and take that child to a
place of safety, the parents, 156 the child, the Reporter and the local
authority (if they are not the applicant) of the order. Once granted the
CPO has to be implemented within 24 hours or it will lapse.15 7 The
Reporter then has to arrange for a hearing within the CHS and this
must take place on the second working day after the child was taken
to a place of safety. 158 This "initial hearing" will decide if the order
should be continued and if so, a second hearing has to take place on
the eighth working day after the order was made; 159 this second
hearing will determine whether a compulsory supervision order
should be made.
While the CPO can include a direction giving authority for a
medical examination of the child and related treatment; 160 this
medical examination cannot be carried out without the consent of the
child. 161 In Scot's law, under the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act
1991, individuals under the age of 16 have the right to consent on
their own behalf to any surgical, medical or dental procedure, or
treatment, when a qualified medical practitioner considers s/he is
capable of understanding the "nature and possible consequences of
the procedure or treatment." 162 While the consent of the parent to a
medical examination will in most instances also be sought for
children under the age of 16 years, this can be dispensed with if it is
"contrary to the safety and the best interests of the child." 163

156 The 2011 Act actually uses the term 'relevant persons' rather than 'parents,' but
under The Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 (Review of Contact Directions
and Definition of Relevant Person) Order 2013, all parents are 'relevant persons'
unless a court has removed their parental rights and responsibilities.
151 Id. at para. 52(2).
15s Id. at para. 45(3).
159 Id. at para.
46.
160 Id. at para. 37(2)(d).
161 Id. at para.
186.
162 Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act, 1991, supra note
106, para. 2(4).
163 National Guidance, 2010, supra note 115, para. 343. Similarly, "when a medical
examination is thought necessary for the purposes of obtaining evidence in criminal
proceedings but the parents/carers refuse their consent, the Procurator Fiscal may
consider obtaining a warrant for this purpose," id. at para. 344.
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Child Assessment Orders (CAO)

Medical examinations of the child may also be authorized by
a court, upon evidence, via a Child Assessment Order, when the local
authority has reason to suspect that the child either has or is currently
suffering from neglect or harm. This order specifically authorizes "an
officer of a local authority or a person authorized by that officer to
carry out an assessment of the child's health or development, or the
way in which the child has been or is being treated or neglected."1 64
The order can only be granted when the court is satisfied that it is
unlikely that the assessment could be carried out, or carried out
satisfactorily, unless the order was made. The order has to take effect
within 24 hours of the order being granted and must not last longer
than three days. 165
In contrast to the natural investigation and treatment of a
child who has been admitted to the hospital due to illness or injury,
non-medical professionals coming into contact with a child they
suspect may have been maltreated may not medically examine a
child. Scottish National Guidance for Child Protection makes it clear
that:

Decisions about whether or not a medical
examination is required should not be taken by police
and social work staff without consulting a suitably
qualified health professional as identified and agreed
locally ... discussion with Health staff colleagues is
essential in order that the welfare needs of the
child/young person are considered together with the
need to collect forensic evidence. Decisions about the
nature and timing of medical examinations should be
made by appropriately trained pediatricians. 166
The guidelines assert that this multiagency approach means that
fewer children are subjected to medical examinations. They also
emphasize that:
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act, 2011, supra note 122, para. 3 5(2).
This is to prevent such orders being sought unless it is considered that there is
immediate risk of significant harm.
166
National Guidance,2010, supra note 115, para. 306.
164
165
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In planning any joint investigation, consideration
should be given to: the child or young person's
emotional state; whether an adult should be present
to provide support and, if so, who this should be; any
communication or interpreting facilities that may be
required; any specialist input that may be needed;
and any physical or mental health requirements. 167
Once it is decided that such an examination is necessary, it
then becomes necessary to obtain the appropriate court order where
parental consent is not forthcoming. However, it is important not to
lose sight of the fact that child protection investigators will usually
first seek the co-operation of parents. The National Guidance on
Child Protection states, "Decisions should be made with [parents]
agreement, whenever possible, unless doing so would place the child
at risk of suffering significant harm or impede any criminal
investigation."1 68 Consistent with this, social work practitioners and
managers express the following view: "I suppose it's down to
parental co-operation, isn't it. At the end of the day if you can
negotiate something that keeps the child safe and you're not having
to take the order, we know that's better." 169 Consistent with a practice
that seeks to work with families, only 12% of the 22,561 children
referred to the CHS in 2012-2013, were referred following the making
of a CPO. 17 0 No statistics were available on Child Assessment Orders
and it appears they may rarely be used. 171

167
168

Id. at para. 309.

National Guidance, 2014, supra note 114, para. 359.

169 JOE FRANCIS ET AL., PROTECTING CHILDREN IN SCOTLAND: AN INVESTIGATION
OF
RISK ASSESSMENT

AND

INTER-AGENCY

COLLABORATION IN THE USE OF CHILD

PROTECTION ORDERS para. 4.23 (Scottish Executive 2006), available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/923/003 8 16 3 .pdf.
170 Under the Children's Hearings Scotland Act 2011, a place of safety warrant is a

type of CPO. 1,968 children were referred to the CHS after a place of safety warrant
was granted by a court in respect of them, and a further 743 after a CPO, which did
not include a warrant to remove the child to a place of safety (perhaps because the
child was already out of the home that they were maltreated in). SCOTTISH
CHILDREN'S REPORTER ADMINISTRATION, ONLINE STATISTICS 2012/2013 Tables 16-

7

(2013),

available

at
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Some observations on the use of coercion by agents
of the state in child protection in Scotland

The fact that a person investigating child maltreatment can
apply to a court for emergency measures of protection if prevented
from assessing whether an intervention is necessary for the
protection of the child inevitably gives them coercive power.
Further, the Scottish Government, National Guidance for
Child Protection states:
Where agencies are acting in fulfillment of their
statutory duties, it is not necessary or appropriate to
seek consent - for example, where a referral is made
to the Reporter under the Children (Scotland) Act
1995 or where a report is provided by the local
authority in the course of an investigation by the
Reporter under the Act. In such instances, the consent
of a child and/or parents should not need to be
sought prior to the submission of a report. 172
Such coercive power can be argued to be justifiable on the
basis that the investigator, as an agent of the State, is both under a
statutory duty to promote the welfare of the child and is subject to the
checks and balances of due process. As we have seen, he or she
cannot, for example, obtain a Child Protection Order enabling the
removal of the child from the family home unless the court is
satisfied that the child is at risk of significant harm. Similarly, if the
child is referred to the Reporter of the CHS, there will only be a
Children's Hearing if the Reporter is satisfied that the grounds of
referral exist. Only 20% of all children referred to the CHS went on to
173
be the subject of a hearing before a panel.

http://www.scra.gov.uk/cmsresources/SCRA%200nline%2oStatistics%20201213.pdf.
1 71
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Bill, 2010, (SP Bill 41), available at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S3 Bills/Childrens%20Hearings%20(Scotland)%
20Bill/b41s3-introd-pm.pdf.
172
National Guidance, 2010, supra note 115, para. 91.
173 SCOTTISH CHILDREN'S REPORTER ADMINISTRATION, supra note 137, at 22.
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Further, decisions taken by agents of the state have to be
regularly reviewed, rather than say, children remaining long term on
a compulsory supervision order without review. 174 A key example of
this is that when a compulsory supervision order from the CHS is in
place, the case has to be reviewed within a year, and parents may
also request an earlier review at any point after three months have
elapsed from the making of the order. 175 At the review, the
compulsory assessment order can be continued, varied, or terminated
by the panel. Because children who are the subject of a Child
Protection Order are immediately referred to the CHS, their cases
also fall to regular review by this panel. The actual CPO itself may
only last a maximum of eight working days from the time of its
granting by a court. While, as previously stated, a Child Assessment
Order (CAO) may only last for a period up to three days.
Extensive rights of appeal also exist within the process for
managing cases of child maltreatment. For example, appeals may be
made to a court against the decision of a CHS;176 while cases before
the CHS will either be referred to a sheriff court or discharged if the
parents (or the child) do not accept the grounds for referral to the
CHS.177 It is also possible for a person to appeal against the
determination that they are not a "relevant person" in respect of the
child and therefore, have no right to attend the CHS hearing; 178or
against a direction concerning contact between the child and that
person which has been made by the CHS.179
Additionally, in Scotland, decisions made by public bodies
can be challenged via a process of judicial review even when there is
no statutory provision for appeal against a decision. Judicial review
was developed "to ensure that public bodies which exercise law
making power or adjudicatory power are kept within the confines of

174 The focus of this article is child maltreatment investigationsrather
than the role of
the state in continued interference in family life following removal the actual
removal of children into the care system (usually kinship or foster care). It is worthy
of note however that there are additional review processes for children once in care
in Scotland that are not covered in this paper.
175 Children's Hearings (Scotland) Act, 2011, supra note
122, para. 132.
176 Id. at para. 154(1).
177 Id. at para.
93.
178 Id. at para.
160.
179 Id. at para.
161.
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the power conferred."1 80 The basis for judicial review of the decision
has to be based on the claim that the person or body who made the
decision acted outside their powers, and the focus of the review is
lawfulness of the decision making process. The case of NJ v. Lord
Advocate discussed earlier is one such case. 181
Clearly gaining the co-operation of parents is to be desired, rather
than the imposition of compulsory interventions. However, it is
important not to lose sight of the fact that non-compliance is a known
risk factor for child maltreatment. As the National Guidance for
Child Protection in Scotland states: "If there are risk factors
associated with the care of children, risk is likely to be increased
where any of the responsible adults with caring responsibilities fail to
engage or comply with child protection services." 182 This includes
those parents who act with apparent compliance but fail to carry out
the actions requested or prevent them from being effective. 183 It may
also include those parents who do actually conform to requests for a
period of time, in an attempt to end the interference in their family
life by state officials, but who then return to their previous ways once
they are no longer the focus of attention. Such "disguised
compliance" has been found to be a feature of many serious case
reviews undertaken following the death of a child. 184
It would clearly render the child maltreatment investigation
endeavor powerless in the face of parental opposition if agents of the
state were not imbued with the power to coerce when necessary, so

180 HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 837 (Cavendish

Publishing 4 th ed. 2002).
181 NJ v. Lord Advocate [2013] CSOH 27. In this case,
the Child Protection Orders
in question had long been terminated and superseded by further child protection
procedures by the time the judicial review was undertaken by the court (as they only
last a matter of days). However, despite the fact that there is a common law principle
that a court will not entertain 'hypothetical' questions, the court exercised its longstanding discretion and addressed the issue of the lawfulness of the refusal to hear
the mothers' views at the time the CPO were granted.
182 National Guidance, 2010, supra note
115, para. 436.
183 In the literature this is oddly often referred to as 'disguised compliance' when
what is really 'disguised' is the non-compliance.
184 MARIAN BRANDON ET AL., ANALYSING

CHILD DEATHS AND SERIOUS INJURY

THROUGH ABUSE AND NEGLECT: WHAT CAN WE LEARN? A BIENNIAL ANALYSIS OF

SERIOUS CASE REVIEWS 2003-2005 (DCSF Publications 2008).
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that there may be an effective assessment of the circumstances of a
child.
CONCLUSION

Whether in the United States or in Scotland, on a practical
level, the distinction between coercion and persuasion has its roots in
the attitude of the CPS investigator. In the final analysis, to minimize
unnecessary coercion is to acknowledge that CPS investigators must
see themselves defined less by their position, and more by someone
whom others perceive as prudent, understanding, and reasonable.
The key to getting the subject of an investigation to support an
alternate perspective is to shift their focus from what they stand to
lose, to what they stand to gain. As Benjamin Franklin said, "If you
would persuade, you must appeal to interest rather than intellect."
Persuasion is getting someone's voluntarily agreement. For the CPS
investigator, the blunt instruments of authority are always available,
coercion.
works
better
than
but
motivation
often

